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PUZZLING STOCK OPTIONS AND COMPENSATION NORMS
SAUL LEN,,MORE'
Wzy do so many executives and other employees receive fixed stock options as
part of their compensation packages? Even though there is an impressive litera-
ture on compensatory options, it raises more puzzles than it solves. Tax law, op-
tion theory, and agency theory all suggest that we might have expected to find
quite different practices than we observe. In particular, there is a puzzle in the
popularity of conventional fixed options when indexed options would seem to be
relatively attractive. The solution or story offered here develops arguments about
signaling; employees will not want to be seen as preferring cash over options in
their own employer's future. It relies on the idea that indexed options encourage
more risk alteration, or inefficient differentiation, than other forms of compensa-
tion and it introduces the notion that there is something of a norm in favor of
nonconflictingfortunes within a community. The norm part of the argument says
something about the more general norm of privacy with respect to money matters
and it illuminates the occasional practice of confidentialit regarding one's own
compensation. This practice might be stable because of the negative signals emit-
ted by defectors. The same analysis might help explain why stock option practices
are somewhat sticky.
INTRODUCTION
This Article is in part about a puzzle associated with stock options
and employee compensation. Many firms, and virtually all firms in
certain industries, use stock options to form a significant part of the
compensation they pay their more highly compensated employees.
These options could take many forms, but there is remarkable con-
formity in the practice of giving a class of employees a large percent-
age of compensation (in expected value terms) in the form of options
with strike prices set at or slightly above the underlying stock's market
value at the time the options are granted. Moreover, this compensa-
tion practice has grown in popularity. It is associated with start-ups,
especially with respect to granting options even to nonmanagerial
employees, but it has grown to include a majority of traded firms and
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many employees who, individually, would seem to have only remote
influence on firm profits or share prices.!
Criticism of this expansion of compensatory options has largely
focused on the market value of these options and the frequent reissue
or revision of options when these options become nearly worthless be-
cause of declines in share prices for the market as a whole or even for
the employer-firm.2 Revisions are defended as necessary to recreate
the incentives and alignment of interests that were present before
these options dropped underwater. But critics fear that agents are
somehow overpaying themselves with options in a way that they could
not with straight compensation. Part I takes prevailing practices and
criticisms as its starting point, comparing conventional stock options
to bonus plans and to indexed options. The discussion pays particular
attention to risk and to tax law. Something of a puzzle emerges as to
I See Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Align-
ment or Shareholder Expropriation ?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 123-24 (2000) (suggest-
ing that stock option grants to CEOs grew rapidly from a component index of 100 to
435 over the 1992-1998 period, while CEO salary rose at a rate only slightly higher than
average employee compensation); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of
Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1025-30 (2000)
(discussing the current trends in executive compensation); Hamid Mehran & Joseph
Tracy, The Impact of Employee Stock Options on the Evolution of Compensation in
the 1990s Jan. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (comparing the
use of stock option grants and realizations for low-, middle-, and high-salary employees
and reporting tripling in realizations from 1995 to 1998 but modest fractions of overall
compensation), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/rmaghome/economist/tracy/The-
Impact-of-Employee-Stock-Options.pdf.2 . .Some of the newer criticism is more closely related to the tack taken here, as it
questions the conventional wisdom that fixed options are tax favored. See, e.g., Calvin
H. Johnson, Stock Compensation: The Most Expensive Way To Pay Future Cash, 85 TAX
NOTES 351 (1999) (arguing that stock compensation typically is more expensive than
debt or deferred compensation); Merton H. Miller, The Case for Expensing Stock Options
Against Earnings, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1994, at 88 (discussing the tax impli-
cations of accounting rules on stock options); James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incen-
tives To Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 697 (1997) (arguing
that tax provisions permit stock options to create corporate imbalances between man-
agement and shareholders). But see Kevin Wiggins, Capital Gain v. Ordinary Income and
the FICA Tax Treatment of Employee Stock Purchase Plans, 53 TAX LAW. 703 (2000) (argu-
ing that despite FSA 1999-26034's drastic changes as to how amounts received under
an employee stock purchase plan should be treated for FICA purposes, only the em-
ployer-provided discount, and not the entire option gain, is to be subject to FICA).
On the agency problem relationship, see Don M. Chance et al., The 'Repricing' of
Executive Stock Options, 57J. FIN. ECON. 129 (2000), arguing that repricing is more likely
to occur in firms of smaller size, with greater agency problems, and with insider-
dominated boards. Finally, for a legal perspective on revisions, see EricJ. Wittenberg,
Underwater Stock Options: What's a Board of Directors To Do ?, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 75 (1998)
addressing the legal considerations a board must weigh in deciding to rescind old op-
tions and issue new options at a discount from the current market price.
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why conventional compensatory options are so popular. I refer to this
as the "stock option puzzle."
Part II develops the idea that conventional practice may be ex-
plained with a combination of considerations. I describe one of these
as "super-risk alteration" and another as something of a norm regard-
ing the "nonconflicting fortunes" among similarly situated employees,
or within other communities. These ideas play important roles in part
because employees are, quite understandably, not compensated with
instruments that extract payments from them when the firm does rela-
tively poorly. A third consideration is signaling. At several points in
the analysis, it appears that employees would have trouble bargaining
away from prevailing practices because to do so might send an un-
pleasant signal that is wisely avoided.
Part III suggests that the norms portion of the argument is more
plausible than it first seems because a similar norm regarding noncon-
flicting fortunes can be found in other settings. I do not insist that
the norns label is critical to the larger explanation regarding com-
pensation practices. It is possible that the work done by the norms ar-
gument could be rendered by a related claim about potential effi-
ciency costs in the face of conflicts among employees. But the norms
label does provide some purchase, and the focus, in any event, is on
the larger task of explaining the popularity of conventional stock op-
tions. Moreover, compensation practices seem somewhat sticky and
might, therefore, themselves be understood as constituting or reflect-
ing various norms.
I. THE STOCK OPTION PUZZLE
A. Incentive-Compatible Alternatives
1. Compensatory Stock Options and Bonus Plans
If there is a puzzle about options, it is in the details rather than
the overall abstraction. The abstract idea is simply to provide employ-
ees, and especially high-level managers, with compensation packages
that mitigate agency costs. Managers who receive straightforward, un-
adorned salaries might do what pleases shareholders who hold resid-
ual equity claims, if only because managers care about their reputa-
tions, pay increases, or other issues. But it is easy to see why
shareholders might prefer that compensation track performance
more directly, and one way to do this is to tie employee well-being to
the firm's share price. The idea is to motivate managers with some-
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thing less than a one-period lag. Of course, managers might make
themselves attractive by bonding themselves through compensation
packages that rise and fall with shareholder value. Incentive-
compatible compensation offers, or ideas, might originate on either
side of the employment bargain.
There are, of course, many ways to align managerial well-being
with shareholders' (or all investors') goals. This is hardly the place for
a review of all such alternatives or for a catalogue of the advantages
and pitfalls of each. But it is useful to visit some obvious alternatives.
Employees of all stripes might be promised bonuses, perhaps at
year's end, based loosely or tightly on the firm's profits or the employ-
ees' individual performances, defined and measured one way or an-
other. Some bonuses, including those paid at many law firms, are nei-
ther specified nor guaranteed in advance, in which case a bonus is
much like a raise-except that the employee can choose to depart
immediately after the bonus is paid and the bonus does not become
part of the employee's base salary for the purpose of future raises and
benefits. In some settings these bonuses might be better thought of as
liquidated damages aimed at preventing disruptive departures, but
there is nothing terribly remarkable about slightly uncertain ex post
rewards.3
3 In some settings, paying compensation on a daily basis solves more problems
than it creates, but in other settings, disruption can be managed by withholding some
compensation.
It is tempting to dwell also on commissions, which can be thought of as a form of
bonus. Commissions are simply compensation that is linked to sales or other outputs
thought to be in the individual's control, though they can often be seen as a subtle
form of profit-sharing. But commissions-at least as the (nonlegal) term is normally
used-are more incremental than are bonuses (which are sometimes all or nothing in
character) and they are often committed to by contract while bonuses are often discre-
tionary on the employer's part. I have discussed commissions elsewhere, and I resist
the temptation to say more here. For the present, the idea is simply that almost any-
thing that can be done with popular, fixed compensatory options can be accomplished
at least as well with well-designed bonuses and commissions. And there are some
things that are far easier to do with bonuses, including the design of individualized in-
centives.
To be sure, bonuses and commissions are very popular. Even without good data,
one can surmise that more employees receive income in the form of bonuses and
commissions than in the form of stock options. An optimist might say that we find
commissions for low-level employees where monitoring is best accomplished in terms
of some output. Bonuses might require more tailoring, and we find these for mid-level
employees. They might be linked to a division's profits or loosely linked to hours
worked and the firm's overall profitability. Finally, stock options can be seen as bo-
nuses for high-level employees whose efforts affect the entire firm and therefore the
stock price. For a more complete (and optimistic) description, including some discus-
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As compared with common stock options, an interesting thing
about typical end-of-period bonuses-and even, perhaps, voluntary
severance payments made to employees-is that they can be individu-
alized even as they are linked to firm performance. A given employee
is likely to perceive that her end-of-year bonus is very sensitive not only
to the firm's overall profits, but also to a supervisor's or committee's
perception of her individual performance during the preceding year.
Even if the employee reasons that the true aim of the bonus is to dis-
courage exit and to encourage hard work in the coming year, there is
likely to be a strong correlation between the strength of these mana-
gerial sentiments and the individual's performance in the completed
year.
Stock options can be designed to be close substitutes for these
conventional bonuses. Employees simply might not know in advance
how many options they will receive at the end of a period, or, for that
matter, what the exercise price will be. The exercise price and dura-
tion probably need to be set by the employer at the start of the period,
so that employees will see that hard work and firm success during the
period raises the expected value of their options. The number of op-
tions each employee receives-whether individualized or not-can in
principle be determined at the end of the period based on the em-
ployee's performance. Employees might then be made indifferent be-
tween conventional bonuses and stock options. Both are expected to
rise ith the value of the firm, and both can be individually tailored
sion of employee risk aversion (a topic discussed below, beginning in Part I.C), see
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Tailored Claims and Governance: The Fit Between
Employees and Shareholders, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 121, 130-33
(Margaret M. Blair & MarkJ. Roe eds., 1999). But there are many counterexamples to
this three-part division. A more pessimistic or puzzling perspective is to wonder why
compensatory options emerged when well-designed bonuses could do all the necessary
work. The text goes on to emphasize the advantage-and relative scarcity-of indexed
options, which would appear to be more incentive-compatible than conventional fixed
options; the latter reward employees for gains they could not have produced and lose
their incentihe feature when share prices drop, so that the already-granted options are
"out of the money" and incapable of influencing future work effort. Indexed options,
like conventional options, generally start out with a specified time period of, say, three
to ten years during which the holder can buy the underlying stock at the specified ex-
ercise price, which is normally set at the market price at the date of grant. Exercise
might be limited to employees who remain with the firm and in any event the options
are usually nontransferable or somewhat restricted. The options are, of course, more
valuable the longer the option period and the more volatile the underlying stock.
With indexed options, the exercise price normally varies with a benchmark such as the
S&P 500 or a basket of stocks in the issuing firm's own industry. The idea is to reward
the employee when the firm does relatively well (even if the firm's stock price had
dropped in absolute terms).
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with something of an ex post component, if so desired.
These not quite conventional stock options-and others as well-
may be inferior to bonuses from both employer and employee per-
spectives because of the risk that in the course of the period in ques-
tion the price of the firm's stock will fall. The straightforward case is
when there is a widespread drop in the stock market, so that the de-
crease in the expected value of an option could not have been pre-
vented by better performance on the part of the employee or even by
the particular firm as a whole. The same is true if only this firm's
price falls, but for reasons unremediable by our targeted employee.
The problem is interesting in part because it is asymmetric. If the
market as a whole rises, the employee still knows that on the margin
(assuming the employee can affect the firm's stock market price
through hard work and so forth) this firm's value will rise more than
average. But if the market drops, and the options are well "out of the
money," then employer and employee will realize that there is no
longer any incentive function served by the options or promise of op-
tions. Even the hardest working employee will not bring the share
price into the range that was expected at the time the options were
granted or written. The risk of such drops might be offset by the
grant of more options in the first place, a topic discussed below in Part
II.C, but the incentive effect is more stubborn.
A related problem accompanying downward market movements
concerns the logistics of pay periods. For a variety of well-known rea-
sons, relating both to practicalities and strategic behavior, employee
compensation is unlikely to depend on the successful completion of a
long period of employment; salaries are likely to be paid in monthly
or even more frequent installments, and in the event of departures or
terminations they may even be pro-rated on a daily basis. The same
will be true of the options component of the compensation package.
Thus, if there is a steep decline in stock prices, then our illustrative
employee will feel undercompensated unless the number of options
or their exercise price is constantly adjusted. The employee who was
promised X in salary plus Y in (the expected value of) options per
month might otherwise find offers from competing firms more attrac-
tive because these competing offers will take current market prices
into account.
In fact, firms that use options to fill a significant part of the com-
pensation package sometimes distribute new options with different
conditions, the most obvious being a lower exercise price, after such a
fall in the market or even a fall in the lone firm's share price. Critics
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might say that this shortchanges nonemployee investors. One form of
the critical claim is that the firm can hardly win; the original compen-
sation package is set with some expectation about market prices. If
the market rises more than expected (apart from gain attributable to
the relevant employees), the employee enjoys a windfall, and if the
market drops, or rises less than expected, the employee simply re-
ceives new or revised options. Superficially, this looks too good for
the employees.
Even when the firm will not issue new options or revise existing
options when the shares drop in value, the firm can be seen as giving
away something for nothing in a rising market. But since this may be
offset by the employee's loss in a falling market, I prefer the first ver-
sion of the criticism. One way or another, a reasonable claim exists
that these options, or more specifically their exercise prices, should be
indexed to the market as a whole or perhaps to the industry in which
the firm competes.'
It is possible that when markets fall, the employer's ability to revise
conventional options terms is a valuable tool. The employer can cut
wages (which are otherwise thought to be inefficiently sticky) in this
manner, by not revising or resetting the options. Similarly, employees
might choose to depart, and the employer would not want them
locked in because of expectations about their options. At the very
least, these possibilities suggest the superiority of conventional options
over many bonus plans. In fact, bonus plans can easily cause employ-
ees to overstay, which may create problems and even litigation for
employers who wish to lay off employees before their bonuses vest. I
will not draw more optimistic conclusions about the value of-rather
than the problem with-conventional options in downturns, if only
because it is unclear who really decides whether to revise options in
downturns.
In theory, many arguments of the sort just advanced can be par-
ried with some claim about well-functioning markets or rational ex-
pectations. If, for example, it is true that there is an asymmetry with
regard to the consequences of market fluctuations for these options,
then employers and employees will perceive this in advance and em-
ployers will need to pay lower salaries (or promise fewer or simply less-
valuable options) in the first place. Everyone can assess the contin-
gent value of the options (and replacement options) because market
The argument is often traced to Bengt Holmstr~m, Moral Hazard and Observabil-
itY, 10 BELLJ. ECON. 74, 82-83 (1979).
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fluctuations can be quantified and the probability that the employer
will feel compelled to revise or reissue options can be estimated.
One response to this reaction-that stock options are unlikely to
be too generous (unless all compensation is too generous) because
there is room for adjustment in other components of the compensa-
tion package-is, of course, to insist that markets are unlikely to work
so well. It is particularly hard to estimate the likelihood that new in-
centives will be handed out in a declining market. Nor are stock op-
tions the only tool that can be described as incentive-compatible,
while actually used to transfer wealth from shareholders to executives
in a form that is difficult to evaluate and monitor.5 Agents could use
bonus plans and commissions to hoodwink their unsophisticated
principals. Indeed, these may be even harder to measure-though
perhaps not as easy to revise in the agents' favor in midstream.
2. Fixed Versus Indexed Options and Accounting Standards
A more interesting reaction to the claim that stock options, and
even their midstream revisions, do more than simply allow agents to
fool and take from their principals, returns us to the question of in-
dexed options. Why are stock options rarely indexed to market (or
industry) prices?' As already suggested, this sort of indexing would
seem to be efficient because it would maintain incentives for the rele-
vant employees even when stock prices fall for reasons beyond their
control. Even the most sophisticated commentators gravitate toward
an explanation that focuses on accounting rules-and therefore on an
idea that is inconsistent with an assumption of well-working markets
with well-informed players. Other notable commentators regard
compensatory options as a means of rent extraction by insufficiently
5 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & David L Walker, Executive Compensation in Amer-
ica: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents? (Nov. 2000) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
See generally Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Proposal
for Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 50 (1997)
("Corporate boards should consider.., the advantages of adopting indexed options,
in order to avoid charges that the executive compensation packages they approve are
irrational.").
7 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 2, at 88-89 ("The arbitrary difference between the ac-
counting for stock options and for alternative forms of compensation produces... bi-
zarre results."); Alfred Rappaport, Misplaced Concerns About Indexed Options, HARV. BUS.
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 91. 94 (arguing that corporate concerns over the use of in-
dexed options is misplaced).
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disciplined managers.8 Under current accounting standards, a firm
that uses conventional, fixed options reports (to shareholders and the
public, as opposed to the tax authorities) compensation expenses
measured on the first date that both the number of shares optioned
and the option exercise price are known.9 The expense calculation is
then based on the compensatory value of the stock options, but this
only consists of any spread by which the quoted market price of the
optioned stock exceeds the option's exercise price. In short, the time
value of the option is essentially ignored.
For example, imagine that an option to purchase 1000 shares on
any date up to January 1, 2002, at an exercise price of 20, is promised
to an employee on January 1, 1997, when the share's market price is
20. Imagine that the option is exercised in 2001, when the stock price
is 30. In 1997 the firm reports no expense associated with this part of
the compensation package because the spread is 0 onJanuary 1, 1997,
when both the number of shares optioned and the exercise price are
known. A firm influenced by accounting conventions may therefore
be disinclined to set the exercise price below the market value at the
time of the grant. Nor is there anything to report some four years
later when the option is exercised. We might think of the firm as re-
porting a cost of 0 in 2001 because its "cost" is seen as 20 (inasmuch as
it could have sold this stock to the public for 20 at the time it was
"promised" to the employee), but it has received 20 because of the
exercise price. Had the exercise price been 15, the firm would have
reported a cost of 5000 in 1997.
There is, of course, value given to the employee with this option,
and this is greater the more volatile the share price and the longer the
term. The value of this option could therefore be calculated, but the
firm need not do so-except that, beginning in 1995, accounting
standards required the firm to disclose in a footnote what impact the
options would have had on net income and on earnings per share if
the accounting rules had required a "fair value" method that would
have taken this time value into account.' The footnote thus reports
See Bebchuk & Walker, supra note 5.
The accounting rules are discussed in Herbert Kraus, Executive Stock Options and
Stock Appreciation Rights, [2000] Employment Law Series (Law Journal Press) §§ 4.01-
.04. See also Jill E. Lyons & Patrick S. McGurn, Peiformance-Based Equity Awards: The
Road to Real Value, reprinted in COMPENSATION FOR EXECUTIrES AND BROAD-BASED
EMPLOYEE GROUPS: STRATEGY, DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 179, 179 (ALI-ABA,
1998) ("The rapid expansion of equity-based compensation has set many organizations
on a collision course with their large institutional investors.").
jo ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Financial Ac-
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not some measure of the value to the recipient, but rather one meas-
ure of the opportunity cost to the employer. An alternative might
have been the market value of the options or even the compensation
costs likely "saved" because of the grant of the incentive-compatible
option, which would require some assumptions about the cost of im-
posing risk on the option holder.
In contrast, if the option is indexed so that the exercise price rises
and falls with a market basket, for instance, then the exercise price is
not known on January 1, 1997, but is only known upon exercise. At
that time the firm will need to report its cost based on the spread. In
our example, when the options are exercised in year 2001, the firm
will now "know" that the cost to it was (30-20) x 1000, or 10,000.
The claim, as is now obvious, is that the parties shy away from in-
dexed, or other variable, options because they must report greater
expenses and then show smaller profits than they do if they deploy
conventional fixed options. Fixed options allow the firm to avoid re-
porting the cost of the time value portion of the option, although the
footnote requires a different ex ante cost estimate. Nor is an ex post
expense reporting required regardless of the actual dilution brought
about by exercise. Indeed, the firm can substitute fixed options for
cash compensation not only to generate hard work on the employee's
part but also to avoid the appearance of expenses."
Variable compensatory options do require an accounting for their
time value (and cost) in ex post fashion by awaiting exercise. The
firm will not, on average, look better by substituting variable options
for salary, though the incentives offered by these options may make
them attractive. The ex ante fair value method, required at most at
the level of footnotes, asks the firm to report both salaries and option
values up front. If indexed options seem to dominate fixed options as
a matter of incentive compatibility, but we find that fixed options ac-
tually dominate (as they do), then we might explain the apparent
counting Standards No. 123 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1995); see also Claw-
son & Klein, supra note 6, at 35-36; Miller, supra note 2, at 88; Kraus, supra note 9,
§ 4.01[1].
1l The argument could also be extended to revisions in the event of downturns.
When compensatory options are underwater and the employer resets the exercise
price, it is arguable that the employer prefers to do this rather than to offer other bo-
nuses for future performance because only the revision alternative escapes recordation
as an expense. There is, however, a proposal to reclassify these options as variable
rather than fixed if the exercise price is reset. See ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO
EMPLOYEES, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25 (Accounting Principles Bd.
1972); ACCOUNTING FOR STOcK-BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Financial Ac-
counting Standards No. 123 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1995).
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puzzle with the observation about accounting rules. Firms appear to
benefit by "hiding" the true cost of compensating their employees.
There are other examples of putative explanations in corporate
law and in finance that depend on accounting rules-and therefore to
a degree on the belief that investors are easily fooled. Fully informed,
rational investors would see the benefit of indexed options, if any, and
would realize that, despite the accounting convention associated with
traditional options, there is a formidable cost associated with selling
shares at the exercise price when they could be sold elsewhere for
more (or when they need not be sold at all, in which case existing eq-
uity owners would share profits fewer ways). In short, the prevailing
explanation for the use of conventional rather than indexed compen-
satory options depends on a substantial degree of investor ignorance.
This, in turn, makes it difficult to argue that we should not be con-
cerned when options are readily revised in bear markets.12 Even if
these revisions or reissues are rationally expected so that the employer
gives less value up front in conventional options, there is a puzzle in
the uncertainty when more straightforward indexed options and bo-
nuses are available. 3
We might turn now to a different explanation for conventional
options. But the puzzle is made more clear, and is perhaps deepened,
by first exploring taxes and risk aversion.
B. Taxes and the Options Puzzle
One can imagine a tax code that unambiguously encourages stock
options. Strong enough encouragement for fixed options, or for any
other form of compensation, can surely explain a preference by actual
taxpayers for the form in question. The discussion thus far has con-
sidered the relative attraction of indexed options in a tax-neutral
world.
Imagine, for instance, that employers could deduct not only the
cost of cash compensation but also the current value of stock options
granted to employees. And imagine that employees were not taxed
U, Note that I am not disputing the idea that, given fixed compensatory options,
there Nill be occasions when it is sensible to rexise or reset them. See Viral A. Acharya
et al., On the Optimality of Resetting Executive Stock Options, 57J. FIN. ECON. 65 (2000).
These authors also review some of the criticism of revision. Id. at 66.
B Accounting standards would, of course, require reporting the costs of these bo-
nuses. See Paul M. Healy, The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Disclosure, 7J. ACr.
& ECON. 85, 106 (1985) (anal)zing the format of typical bonus contracts and their ac-
counting incentive effects).
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on this sort of compensation until (and only if) the options were ex-
ercised in order to ascertain their value to the employee (who might,
for example, need to wait for some contingencies before the options
vested). Similarly, employees might defer tax until they sell the un-
derlying stock. In these cases there would be a substantial mismatch
between the employer's deductions and the employees' income.
Therefore, it seems clear that the parties might bargain (or evolve)
toward pay packages that include a good deal of this sort of currency.
Tax reformers might eventually try to limit employers' deductions or
seek to deny the employees open-transaction treatment, but mean-
while, we could expect to see a great deal of the tax-favored options.
Our present tax system hardly goes this far. Section 422 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code allows an employee to receive and eventually sell
qualified incentive stock options, recognizing only the capital gain on
the sale, whereas compensation is normally taxed as ordinary in-
come.14  The qualifications include an annual limit of $100,000
(measured in the underlying stock),15 a requirement that the exercise
price be no less than the market price at the time of the grant,' 6 and a
holding period of at least two years after the date of grant and one
year after the date of exercise. 7 The employer, however, has no de-
duction. 8 Without this last rule, compensatory options would obvi-
ously be attractive, and many observers are quick to assume that com-
pensatory options are indeed tax-favored.
We can understand any favorable tax treatment associated with
qualifying incentive options as reflecting the idea that the holding pe-
riod (along with the other terms of the option) is necessary for incen-
tive compatibility, but that it is something of an "imposition" on the
employee because cash would be more attractive. The employee
could always choose to invest cash in the employer's stock, and such
normal stock would be perfectly alienable. We can also challenge any
favorable treatment with the observation that if the employee regards
incentive-compatible compensation as less attractive than ordinary in-
come, then the market will force employers to give out more of this
incentive-laden currency. The right treatment might be something in
between (adjusting even for the employee's unusual risk, as discussed
later), but this is sufficiently complicated that the Code tries to com-
14 I.R-C. § 422(a)-(d) (1994).
15 Id. § 422(d).
6 Id. § 422(b) (4).
7 Id. § 422(a)(1).
18 Id. § 421 (a) (2).
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promise, perhaps, with the $100,000 limitation.
In any event, the treatment associated with qualified options can-
not explain why indexed options are not more popular. Even if the
market price falls and the indexed exercise price drops, the options
qualify because the "option price is not less than the fair market value
of the stock at the time such option is granted."' 9
In the case of a nonqualifying option of "readily ascertainable
value," the employee has income equal to the fair market value of the
options received at the time they are granted.29 If value is not readily
ascertainable at grant time, which occurs generally when the stock at
issue is not widely traded, the employee waits until exercise or disposi-
tion and reports the difference between receipts and cost (exercise
price) at that time." At the time the employee has income, the em-
22ployer has a deduction. Note that if the exercise price were lower
than the market value at the time of the grant, the employee would
again have income in the same amount as the employer's deduction-
even though the employer is using its own stock in which it is ordinar-
ily treated as having no basis. Thus far these options may seem harm-
less in tax terms or perhaps mildly advantaged compared to cash.
It is misleading, however, to focus on putative tax advantages for
the option-holding employee, when the real issue is whether or not
the combined taxes of employer and employee make one form of
compensation relatively attractive. Returning to qualifying incentive
stock options, for example, in the event of an eventual exercise follow-
ing appreciation of the underlying stock and the approaching end of
the option period (including, perhaps, employee departure), the em-
ployee has capital gain rather than ordinary income-but the em-
ployer has no deduction at all. Similarly, if the employer repurchases
the stock from the employee, the employee has capital gain in most
cases but the employer has no deduction. Within a broad range of as-
sumptions, this tradeoff is a poor deal in terms of tax planning.23
Compensatory options of this sort are likely to be tax disadvantaged
rather than advantaged, as is commonly supposed.
In the case of nonqualifying options, the employee can be seen as
taxed on the time value and volatility value of options at the time of
"Id. § 422(b)(4).
26 C.F.R § 1.83-7(a) (2000).
'Id. § 1.83-7(b) (2).
I.R.C. § 83(h).
SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 365-67 (arguing that employee capital gain is not
"optimal tax planning").
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grant or exercise or disposition. There is a corresponding deduction
to the employer, but this merely duplicates the match that is available
for most employer expenses, including straight compensation. And,
to repeat, qualifying incentive stock options do offer an apparent ad-
vantage to the employee in the form of deferred capital gain, but this
advantage is easily overwhelmed by the fact that the employer has no
deduction at all. I think it is fair to conclude that, at least in most
cases, if rational well-informed players (including shareholders at
large) choose to use options to compensate certain employees, it must
be because of their incentive effects rather than any tax advantages.
By contrast, bonuses would provide deductions (as well as matching
ordinary income).
Moreover, it continues to be quite puzzling that indexed options
are not more popular. They would offer the same perceived tax ad-
vantages as conventional options-and the same more likely disadvan-
tage-and they would seem superior in terms of incentive effects.4
Put slightly differently, instead of giving an option worth $50,000 to an
employee, the employer could sell stock or equivalent options to out-
side investors, receive this money tax free (because no gain is recog-
nized on the sale of the issuer's own stock), and then pay the receipts
to the employee, perhaps in the form of a bonus or deferred compen-
sation tailored to whatever seemed appropriate as an incentive. The
employee is taxed on the whole amount at, for example, 39% but the
employer has a deduction at its marginal rate of, perhaps, 35%.
At the risk of stating the obvious, we can at least understand the
relative popularity of qualifying compensatory options, even (or espe-
cially) for low-level employees-though perhaps not un-indexed op-
tions-in Silicon Valley and other start-up hotbeds. If the employer
has no need for deductions at present, then converting employee or-
dinary income into capital gain (when, once again, there is no cost to
losing the employer's deduction) is quite attractive. Taxpaying firms
do not gain from offering secretaries qualifying stock options because
the employee's capital gain is normally more than offset by the em-
ployer's loss of the deduction. But a start-up firm with no expected
tax liability in the near future is much happier to give up deductions
in order to profit (through lower overall wage bills) from giving secre-
taries capital gain rather than ordinary income with respect to a por-
24 1 set aside the possibility that conventional compensatory options help with con-
traction in the event of downturns, and note that well-designed bonuses could do the
same.
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tion of their compensation packages.5
Calvin Johnson goes much further.2' He would have us recognize
the superior performance of equity over debt, and then have us con-
fess that firms that use stock as compensation are essentially choosing
the most expensive way of paying future cash. They are giving up
shares that on average will prove very valuable. He therefore finds the
use of compensatory options to be startling and absurd.27 I do not
subscribe to this iew, though my reasons do require some reliance on
a belief in well-functioning markets. And my purpose here does not,
in an), event, require association with all of the Johnson view. It is
enough to see that tax law is unlikely to explain employers' taste for
conventional stock options as a means of paying compensation. That
tax law may actually raise the cost of this form of compensation simply
adds to the puzzle already before us.
C. Risk Aversion and Compensatory Options
1. Risk Premiums, Employees, and Landlords
Compensatory options, included in pay packages in order to align
incentives, can seem very expensive, especially when markets rise and
the options are valued ex post. A fair amount of the finance literature
understands this expense as a function of risk-averse employees." The
There is obviously much more to be said here, and my analysis is meant only as
a first cut. My aim is to offer a story about the popularity of fixed rather than indexed
compensatory options, ideally uith some norms thinking mixed in, and I think it clear
that tax law does not explain this options puzzle. In any event, I can count on my
co)mmentator to pursue the tax angle and intuitions.
_" Johnson, supra note 2.227
7 Sve id. at 368 ("Stock compensation is an expensive means to compensate em-
ployees.").
-" The best method of comparison may be to imagine that employees can take
their pay in the form of employer debt and turn it into employer equity. More gener-
ally,Johnson compares stock options with employer debt, though he also explores the
choice between stock (or stock options) and cash. Id. at 353-54, 367. His focus on "fi-
ture cash," id. at 365-67, may provide a dose of reality because one reaction to the stock
option puzzle is that many start-up firms do not have cash and therefore substitute op-
tions for disbursements. Johnson discusses the question of whether the tax law would
recognize these firms' debt as entitled to interest deductions and the like. Id. at 367.
But this is not the place to dwell on all aspects ofJohnson's provocative work. It is the
fact that taxes not only do not explain the taste for compensatory fixed options, but
also make the puzzle of their popularity greater, that is important here.
" Seeg'., Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock
Options, 90 AM. ECON. Rov., PAPERS & PROCS. OF THE ONE HUNDRED TWELFrH ANN.
MEETING OF THE AM. ECON. ASS'N, May 2000, at 209, 210 ("The value of an option
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idea is that a firm might gain by "forcing" employees to accept pay in
the form of stock options, which align the interests of employees and
shareholders and encourage a more valuable firm, but employees
might require much more of these options than they would in straight
pay because the options force them to hold a risky, undiversified port-
folio. A typical upper-level manager might find more than one-third
of her compensation in this one basket, so to speak.'o One can even
go so far as to show that insiders, who hold substantial wealth in the
form of unexercised stock options with respect to their employer's
stock, might sell stock (when permitted to do so or when able to avoid
detection) even though they know that the firm's future is better than
expected.3' The idea is that the gains from diversification exceed the
benefits of the inside information, which is to say the knowledge that
the expected value or mean return of the stock is favorable.
One implication of this perspective is that we might understand a
firm's disinclination to extend compensatory options to nonman-
agerial employees to reflect the point that these options would be very
costly to the firm because employees of modest wealth might require
especially large premiums to hold (what would amount to) extremely
undiversified portfolios. This fortifies the conventional wisdom that
front-line employees might be better motivated by bonuses or com-
missions that have something to do with their assignment than by op-
tions that reflect stock prices well beyond their influence. Of course,
the general point about risk and compensatory options is that nar-
rowly tailored bonuses might be far superior to conventional options
from an executive's perspective depends on ... managerial risk aversion .... .").
30 See Perry & Zenner, supra note 1, at 131 ("The option-based portion
of. .. compensation increased.., to 35% for all firms [in the sample in 1988.").
Lisa K. Meulbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Under-
standing the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options 8 (2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author). A less exciting point is that a substantial fraction of
employee-held stock options are exercised soon after they vest, at the cost of sacrificing
much of their time value, but presumably to diversify away from the employer-firm. See
Steven Huddart & Mark Lang, Employees Stock Options Exercises: An Empirical Analysis, 21
J. AcCT. & ECON. 5, 41-42 (1996) ("Early exercise is a pervasive phenomenon .... Em-
ployees sacrifice a significant portion of potential value by exercising options before
maturity. That fact... suggests] risk aversion is an important consideration for em-
ployees.... ").
Note that any evidence regarding options that are allowed to expire in the money
might be tempered with the possibility that employer-firms bargain with their option-
holding employees. The employees might receive raises or other compensation in re-
turn for allowing their options to expire and avoiding dilution of prevailing stock hold-
ings. More generally, stock options can, by ex post agreement, be converted into bo-
nus plans or stock appreciation rights.
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from the employee's perspective, and therefore one would think that
employers would regard bonuses as a less expensive means to their
end."2
I should add that where it is common for mid-level and upper-
level employees to receive compensatory stock or stock options, we
will always be able to explain the use of such options in compensating
lower-level employees, or for that matter suppliers, including land-
lords. In some settings, firms might reason that employee morale will
suffer if relative income diverges from some baseline. Secretaries may
resent rather than support managers who earn millions of dollars
from their executive stock options, and it might be thought wise to
"force" options on the secretaries. The risks may not be the same for
all of these employees, but some sense of shared fortune may promote
a sense of community, loyalty, and hard work.'3
Stock options for landlords in lieu of straight lease payments
might also incorporate something of an indexing component.: In a
place like Silicon Valley, where a typical tenant is a firm with volatile
value and prospects, it is likely that other local firms rise and fall with
one's tenant. Demand for real estate is likely to be highly correlated
with most potential tenants' stock values. If the overall trend is be-
lieved to be upward, landlords may be more inclined to agree to long
leases if they can acquire options in the local industry or, more simply,
in the present tenant. We might therefore expect options-as-rent to
be more common in longer leases.3' Again, however, the tenant-firm
'" No doubt some readers will intuit at every turn of the road that options are
popular precisely because they transfer wealth inefficiently or unfairly or simply un-
necessarily from employer to employee. Perhaps high-level employees can fool their
principals with arguments about incentives and thereby acquire enormously valuable
options when they could not have emerged with equivalent bonuses and the like. My
inclination is to look harder for an explanation of prevailing compensation packages.
Moreover, it is unclear how this pessimistic view of options and agency problems ex-
plains the dominance of conventional compensatory options over indexed options.
" I do not put much weight on this idea here, although I do develop the shared
fortune idea in a slightly different context infra in Parts II.D and III.
A Some of these "rental" stock options appear to encourage patience on the land-
lord's part, because the option ends if the landlord ends the lease arrangement and
brings in a new tenant. But others simply give the landlord a stake in the tenant's up-
side return. See Steve Daniels, Landlords To Sign on Dot.com Line, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS.,
Feb. 21, 2000, at I (describing innovation in the Chicago market and describing
tenant-equity deals as commonplace in Silicon Valley); Motoko Rich, Office Landlords
Take Gamble on E-Tenants, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1999, at B16 ("An increasing number of
landlords.., are participating more directly in the risk-as well as the potential re-
wards-associated with these ... companies.").
_ And once the transaction cost of designing these options is absorbed, we might
20011 1917
1918 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:1901
that uses options to pay for real estate space is losing an opportunity
to enjoy tax deductions because the firm's basis in its own stock is
zero. But if this firm has no immediate tax liability, deductions are
useful only in the creation of carryforward losses that will be useful
down the road. In short, it is probably not surprising to find options-
as-rent where there is a local volatile industry, where the tenant has no
present tax liability, and where landlords (more than most employees)
can diversify their portfolios. These characteristics may help form a
better understanding of tenant-landlord payments than the conven-
tional observation that start-ups are cash poor and unable to borrow,
and thus forced to give out options on their futures. The real ques-
tion, of course, is why employees and landlords sometimes take op-
tions rather than debt.
In the case of employees (rather than landlords or suppliers), it
goes almost without saying that if compensatory options are somewhat
puzzling, and part of the puzzle is their cost (because of tax considera-
tions on the employer's part and risk considerations on the part of the
employee or other recipient), the puzzle would really be out of con-
trol if the options did not do something positive to align incentives.
Thus, we should expect the options to offer a long period for exercise,
or we should find contractual requirements that neither the options
nor the acquired stock be sold for some time. We might also expect
rules barring these option-holding employees from escaping the in-
centives-and the serious nondiversification costs-by fiddling on
their own with other financial instruments that can offset the impact
of the compensatory options themselves.3 6
find landlords bargaining for longer leases, assuming the option ends when the land-
lord-tenant relationship ends.
36 On this subject, and for the idea that the contractual rules might be hard to en-
force, might in any event be much firmer than they are at present, and also might be
reinforced by incentive-compatible tax law, see David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedg-
ing: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440
(2000). The available evidence suggests that contractual restrictions are fairly rare. See
Stewart J. Schab & Randall S. Thomas, What Do CEOs Bargain For? An Empirical
Study of Key Legal Components of CEO Contracts (Apr. 3, 2001) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author) (reporting that 62 of 93 sampled contracts with CEOs dis-
cussed stock option compensation and 8 restricted sales of options, with 3 of these re-
stricting pledging and 0 restricting hedging transactions).
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2. Risk and Indexed Options
a. Risk to the Employee (and Cost to the Employer)
The focus on risk in this Part has the potential to illuminate the
puzzle of why indexed compensatory options are not more popular.
Accounting tricks aside, these indexed options would seem to have
more bite and less waste than conventional options (though perhaps
they are not superior in this regard to well-drafted bonuses) in the
quest for incentive-compatible compensation. But now we have the
added notion that it is expensive for employers to impose risky op-
tions on employees. The employers do so, the argument goes, to cre-
ate incentives, but they must increase overall pay in order to compen-
sate their employees for the additional risk the employees bear as a
result of the incentive-compatible options. The employees value these
options far less than the market because other market participants can
hold more diversified portfolios. For these employees, a serious in-
centive amounts to a much larger position in the firm than an out-
sider with equivalent wealth would take.
With this in mind, perhaps we can explain the scarcity of indexed
options with the claim that indexed options would impose even more
risk on employees, so that an employer who sought to use indexed op-
tions of equivalent value for incentive reasons would need to transfer
even more value to the employees as compensation for the risk im-
posed upon them. Apparently, or so the novel argument might go,
this additional compensation is not worth the added incentive.
The idea is plausible and depends on an employer-firm's volatility,
its beta (which is to say, correlation with the risk of the stock market as
a whole), and the likelihood and character of revisions of conven-
tional options in downturns. One can imagine a conventional option
that is in the money for the employee in a state of the world in which
the finm does well while the market does well. For illustrative (non-
technical) purposes, we might think of the employee as estimating
that this will occur one in three times. But an indexed option re-
quires that the firm does better than the benchmark, which this ex-
ample takes to be the market as a whole. It is true that if we hold con-
stant the share of compensation filled by options, the indexed option
will need to cover many more shares than the fixed option. But these
numerous options might only be in the money perhaps one in eight
times. If the employee and the employer are hoping for the tax
treatment associated with qualified options, perhaps because the em-
ployer has no present tax liability, then the employee must hold the
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options and the stock for some time. This required holding period
means that even if the firm's fortunes and the market's swings are
such that at various points the options are in the money, the chance
that they will be by the time the required holding period ends is
lower. It is possible, then, that the indexed options look much riskier
than apparently equivalent conventional options. In turn, the firm
will need to give more of them, or to give more straight salary than
otherwise required in a well-functioning market.
If this claim holds, we will have come a long way toward solving
the puzzle of the relative popularity of conventional compensatory
fixed options over their seemingly superior cousins, indexed options.
Indeed, we may in passing have also explained the dominance of con-
ventional options over bonuses inasmuch as the best-tailored bonuses
for incentive purposes may be a great deal like indexed options. The
more the employer promises large bonuses based on many things go-
ing well, the more risk there is to the employee. Even conventional
commissions can be quite risky for the best salesperson-sales may be
poor because of economic conditions or because the firm's product is
inferior and so forth. Most incentive-compatible pieces of compensa-
tion add risk for the employee, and the employer will need to pay the
employee more in order to gain agreement (or attract employees).
Readers familiar with the finance literature will have already rec-
ognized some flaws in this argument, or at least some offsetting con-
siderations. One reason to think that indexed options do not raise
the employer's cost to prohibitive levels is that, because these options
may be more efficient in creating incentives, the employer may need
less of them (in value terms). By deploying indexed options, the
overall compensation package may now have more straight compensa-
tion than one with conventional options. This line of reasoning adds,
of course, to the puzzle of the relative infrequency with which indexed
compensatory options are found. Indeed, the central puzzle discussed
here is why indexed compensatory options are not more popular than
conventional options, when it is these indexed options that would
seem to offer better incentives with ess risk.
A second, more important reason to think that indexed options
are less risky than conventional ones and that the scarcity of this incen-
tive-efficient tool remains puzzling is that since these options take aim
at the firm's performance net of the market (or industry benchmark),
the employee's risk reflects only firm-specific risk. For firms across a
large beta range, conventional, fixed options are risky largely because
the market as a whole is risky. If the indexed option eliminates the
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market risk, then it would seem to follow that the holder is left with
less risk.
But there is a significant problem with this argument associating
indexed options with lower employee risk. When conventional options
are entirely out of the money because the market as a whole has
dropped, it is not uncommon for the employer to alter the exercise
price, grant new options, or reissue the options for much longer peri-
ods or with other changes. Indeed, much of the criticism of compen-
satory options is focused on these revisions, which tend to be more
common when agency costs are most serious. 3  Indexed options
would seem to spark revision much less often, if at all. In the extreme
case, if an employee always expects revision of the conventional op-
tion deal when the market drops, the fact that indexed options elimi-
nate market risk does not necessarily alter the relative risk picture.
A third (and related) reason for thinking that indexed options are
less risky is that with indexed options there is only firm-specific risk,
which is more easily diversified away by the employee who might buy
stock or options in other firms. It is market risk that the employee
cannot escape; to the extent that these options, or well-designed bo-
nuses, impose firm-specific risk, it can be managed through portfolio
adjustment./
But this avenue of risk reduction is most unlikely, and not simply
because the employee may not have sufficient wealth to fiddle in this
manner. The important point is that the employer-firm will eventually
contract to try to prevent this diversification. In most cases, the incen-
tive compatibility is powerful only if the employee's firm-specific risk
is, in fact, dramatically increased.
,7 St"' e.g., Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Perfornmance-Based Compensa-
timn Positivev Affect Managerial Performance?. 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 267-69
(1999) (using motivation theory to illustrate the problem of manipulating compensa-
tion by repricing and reissuing stock options). An interesting idea is that revisions are
efficient because the), permit employers to distinguish between continuing employees
and ex-employees. But this suggests that employers cannot more simply reduce the
initial option period or provide for option-holding employees' departures.
A fabricated but more intuitive way to think of this, is that indexed options offer
rewards when the market as a whole drops so long as the particular employer's stock
drops less than the market. Meanwhile, conventional options will be out of the money.
Thus, indexed options rewrard less often when the market rises, but since they can also
reward when the market falls, they are less risky than at first apparent. A conventional
option might produce rewards one in three times (ignoring the varying magnitude of
the reward) while an indexed option produces upside rewards only one in eight times.
However, the indexed option also rewards in a down market perhaps another one in
eight times.
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Imagine, for example, that firms A and B compete in the manu-
facture and sale of aircraft, so that the revenues of either firm are
normally at the expense of the other. If A gives its managers indexed
options in A, and the manager can rid herself of firm-specific risk by
entering the other "side" of the market in financial instruments with
respect to A, or the manager can do this by investing in financial in-
struments associated with the stock of aircraft manufacturer B (which
does well when A does poorly), then the very (incentive-based) idea of
the compensatory options will be defeated. As noted earlier, there is
important work on this subject and it is possible that firms (and tax
law) do not do enough to prevent this maneuver by their options-
receiving employees.39 It might, for example, be very difficult to
monitor these employees' investments, especially the investments in
instruments associated with another firm's stock. I will not, therefore,
insist that this firm-specific risk cannot be eliminated by the employee,
but it is probably fair to say that this argument does not negate the
possibility that indexed options may be riskier than conventional op-
tions.
Still, all of these ideas seem rather modest compared to the cen-
tral argument that indexed options would seem to offer much better
incentives than conventional options, while at the same time imposing
less risk on the employee because systematic risk is eliminated. This
is, of course, the stock option puzzle with which we began.
b. Super-Risk Alteration Introduced
There is another risk to consider, and it plays an important role in
the argument that follows. It is that indexed options pose a special
danger because they encourage or tempt option-holding managers to
push the firm to riskier (but lower expected-value) activities. This is
of course true for conventional options, but it is a more serious prob-
lem with indexed options, which is why I refer to the risk as one of
super-risk alteration. 40 Generally speaking, conventional options en-
courage risk alteration of the sort that increases the firm's beta, while
39 Note in passing that if employees can eliminate this firm-specific risk and, in the
case of conventional options, if they can eliminate even more risk than that, then the
employer will find that it can impose its compensatory options at lower cost-albeit
because there is less of an incentive effect.
40 It can also be a more serious problem with other nonconventional options. See
Shane A. Johnson & Yisong S. Tian, The Value and Incentive Effects of Nontraditional Ex-
ecutive Stock Option Plans, 57J. FIN. ECON. 3, 13-15 (2000) (summarizing "differences in
the incentive effects across the nontraditional stock options").
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indexed options encourage differentiation from the benchmark. It
seems likely that executives and other employees have more influence
over the degree of differentiation (from the benchmark chosen by the
employer or through bargaining between the employer and employ-
ees) than over the firm's beta. If so, the super-risk alteration explana-
tion in the text (for the popularity of conventional rather than in-
dexed options) is reinforced. These options are of greater value when
the firm is more volatile, and employees might therefore wish to trade
off expected value for volatility. If the employee profits mightily when
the firm outperforms the designated benchmark, which might be
other (ex ante) similarly situated firms, then the employee will be
tempted to overdifferentiate the firm as compared to the benchmark.
This overdifferentiation can be thought of as a variety of risk altera-
tion. The critical step in explaining the absence of indexed options is
that employer-firms decline to use a tool that will encourage ineffi-
cient and destructive behavior.
In some cases the employer will be able to monitor and penalize
such risk alteration, but in other cases it will be unobservable, or diffi-
cult to sort out. The idea is to focus not only on the employer's need
to offer more compensation in order to induce the employee to ac-
cept risk in the form of options or stock in the employer-firm, but also
on the cost to the employer of monitoring the employee or absorbing
the cost of poorer performance by the firm as it is influenced by these
option-holding employees. With indexed options it is harder than
ever truly to align the interests of employees and other investors.
It is also possible that in some cases a firm can reduce the super-
risk alteration problem by tinkering with the terms of the option in
order to create a kind of partially indexed option. Thus, the firm
might construct a benchmark and then promise a larger reward for
exceeding the benchmark than for falling short of it. Other possibili-
ties might include an unbounded reward for success and a bounded
penalty, or perhaps simply an indexed option that is limited in both
directions as compared to a conventional option. With such a reward
scheme, an employee might simply try hard to outperform theS 41
benchmark rather than to differentiate for the sake of speculation.
But inasmuch as this sort of tinkering depends on the likely avenues
of differentiation and on individual employees' risk attitudes, I think
it is safe to say simply that indexed options introduce risk alteration,
or overdifferentiation, concerns that conventional options do not.
Sv ifra text accompanying note 51 (discussing the upside of indexing).
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Firms might shy away from indexed options in order to avoid these al-
terations or the complexities of guarding against them.
Interested readers can investigate the magnitude of the super-risk
alteration risk with respect to a given employee and with regard to a
variety of instruments that might be used to motivate the employee.
My aim here is only to set the stage for a new theory of why we find so
many conventional compensatory options by raising considerable
doubt as to whether we understand their popularity. If we do not,
then we can put the blame on high agency costs and selfish managers.
We might simply say that the burden shifts to favor the idea that man-
agers take for themselves and their friends at the expense of share-
holders (and even at the costs of society if options encourage ineffi-
cient volatility). That this transfer is in the form of options rather
than straighter compensation might simply be attributed to the ability
of managers to explain to shareholders and legislators the advantages
of incentive-compatible compensation-and then the concurrent ne-
cessity of raising pay or granting more options than might first seem
necessary to compensate options-receiving employees not only for the
replaced salary, but also for the increased risk imposed on them. But
for readers who prefer to think that markets work reasonably well, it is
unlikely that agents can so easily fool their principals, who are hardly
all amateurs. The question then is whether we can develop a better
story about the popularity of conventional stock options. My claim,
developed further below, is that the idea of super-risk alteration plays
a critical role in this story.
II. COMPENSATION NORMS
A. Getting Started (with Some Form of Compensation)
Imagine a firm that pays its employees in cash. 3 It is fairly easy to
see how such a firm might (or might not) come to substitute some
common fringe benefits, including some conventional stock options,
42 The matter is recognized in Johnson & Tian, supra note 40, at 18 (discussing
risk-alteration effect for a number of instruments), although the finance literature
hardy emphasizes the problem.
A purist might ask for some theory as to how that currency, or baseline, took
hold at the outset. My story of the evolution to conventional but not to indexed op-
tions relies on the idea that compensation practices are somewhat sticky and that ex-
perimentation with new forms of pay and incentives may be limited. Paradoxically,
rational employers (and employees) who forecast such stickiness might reduce ex-
perimentation yet further.
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for cash or for subsequent pay increases. In the case of traditional
fringe benefits, marginal employees or a large majority of all employ-
ees might give up wages of 100 in order to accept benefits they value
at 105, but that cost their employer (and are valued in the market-
place at) 95. In many cases, the gain comes from collective acquisi-
tion. Thus, workplace amenities, pensions, and health insurance
might be less expensive when acquired by or for a group of employ-
ees, and the employer solves a collective action problem by providing
the benefit and imposing it on all employees.4 In many cases, tax law
adds to or provides the differential by allowing purchase by the em-
ployer out of pretax dollars. The employer receives a deduction for
this expense just as she does for straight cash compensation, while the
employees are not taxed on the value of the benefits they receive,
though of course they would have been taxed on cash. In some cases
these employees would have partial deductions if they purchased
these goods for themselves, but in many cases they would not, if only
because of statutory floors, a precondition that they itemize, or other
such reasons.
There obviously is nothing remotely mysterious about the evolu-
tion toward fringe-benefit-laden compensation packages. Indeed, if
tax law is too friendly, employers and employees might agree on bene-
fits that they otherwise would not purchase. Nor is it entirely surpris-
ing to find some employers who resist these new packages. These
employers might appeal to potential employees who value the benefits
in question less than most.
Compensatory stock options might themselves have just such a
genesis, because tax law once made them fairly attractive." But this is
an awkward story to pursue because it implies unusual stickiness with
respect to some benefits and not others. Expensive Christmas gifts to
employees all but disappeared after tax law changed to exempt only
4 The collective action approach can also explain how tax law limits the revenue
loss by using a nondiscrimination requirement. SeeJulie A. Roin, United They Stand,
Divided They Fall: Public Choice Theory and thw Tax Code, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 62 (1988)
(examining the collective action problem as a barrier to the success of a scheme for
minimizing taxes).
4- Of course, we might imagine that with different practices, political pressure
would build to make these recipient-level deductions more readily available.
+1 Prior to Commissionerv. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956), employees who received op-
tion grants were treated as receiving a "proprietary interest" in their employers rather
than compensation. Note that even this will be unfavorable for some taxpayers who
prefer the employer's deduction associated with ordinary compensation.
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de minimis gifts from the employees' income;41 we might have ex-
pected compensatory stock options to wilt rather than to flourish.
B. Bargaining as Signaling
Stock options are unlikely to be cheaper when provided collec-
tively, and we have already seen that tax law might be put aside or
even marshaled in favor of the idea that options not be used as com-
pensation. Still, it might be easy to explain the introduction of incen-
tive-compatible elements to the compensation package, whether in
the form of bonuses, stock, or options. The parties might reason that
the pie will grow with such incentives and so they agree to share the
gains from this substitution, even though some undesirable risk is im-
posed on virtually all recipients. If employees do not wish to accept
the risk unless compensated in the form of higher overall wages (in-
cluding fringe benefits), or a risk premium, the employer might
choose to impose the risk at this cost in order to gain its share of the
still greater product. With a variety of assumptions we can easily imag-
ine some evolution to bonuses and to compensatory options.
But imagine that an employee's own risk attitude, or own portfo-
lio, means that this employee would very much prefer cash to options.
The employee thinks that she could make this change in a way that
saves the employer considerable expense. Perhaps, on average, the
employer is offering a good combination of incentives and (costly)
risk, but this employee knows that she is out of the ordinary. The
problem is that if the employee suggests a tailored alteration (or an
alteration for all employees), the employer might see this as a signal
that the employee has less-than-average confidence in her own work
effort, in the firm's prospects, in her own likelihood of staying at the
firm long enough to benefit from the options, and so forth. The em-
ployee may be fearful of making a mutually beneficial offer because to
do so is to send a confusing signal. The employer will not know the
employee's motivation and on average the message is negative.
Nor will it do much good for the employer to initiate the deal and
to offer stock options and cash as alternative forms of compensation
in search of those employees who would take the options in return for
the most modest risk premiums. It is true that employees can accept
or reject this form of payment according to their own risk preferences
and ability to diversify with other wealth, but there will again be the
47 See generally MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 67-70 (1999).
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fear that the employer will interpret the employee's choice in a nega-
tive manner. It might even be unwise for the employer to offer the
choice with some acoustical separation in place in order to ensure
that the employer will never know which employees have accepted
which packages. Even if the obvious logistical problems could be
solved, the employer might lose from the self-selection by employees.
Indeed, in a world in which many employers offer stock options, the
remaining employers must be fearful that they will attract employees
who plan to put in low work effort or to turn over rapidly before op-
tions vest. Optimistic employers might hope to get those employees
who simply do not like risk but it may be hard to separate these
groups. Moreover, within a single firm, employees who choose cash
over options may not only be signaling their likely departure or their
low self-assessment but also their own predictions about the firm's fu-
ture. Managers or principals may wish to repel rather than attract
such employees and employees will not want to send these signals.9
Even if the employee would accept a good deal less in cash than in op-
tions, the employee will hesitate to reveal this fact to the employer.
Employers might also affirmatively seek employees who like risk.
These employees, as managers, may help the shareholders engage in
risk alteration at creditors' expense. There is a significant fear that
managers are too risk averse for shareholders' tastes."' More gener-
ally, the very point of options may be to align the incentives of these
employees and the firm's shareholders. If generic managers are
thought to be risk-averse, empire-building, and salary-protecting char-
acters, firms wfill not want to attract the most risk-averse managers.
They will prefer to look for signs that their employees are unusual risk
takers and in turn they can attract such managers by offering stock op-
tions instead of cash. Meanwhile, rational employees will, once again,
1 At the risk of repetition, an employee may wish to bargain with the employer,
offering cost savings in return for less risk, but the danger is that the employer will
read her as displaying a propensity to shirk, an expectation that she will soon depart
from the firm (before any holding period or option period ends), inside information
or simply an inclination to believe that the firm is in worse shape than the market
knows, and exen nothing more than serious risk aversion, which the employer might
see as incompatible with the culture of the business. This step is not only familiar by
now but also fairly intuitive; if executives were offered stock options in lieu of cash
(and with a market value exceeding the cash alternative), we would expect few execu-
tives to have the courage (or foolishness) to turn down the options in favor of the cash.
See, e.g., Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (1984) (noting that risk-averse managers are likely to
'cheat' shareholders by surreptitiously choosing business strategies that are less prof-
itable to the firm but less risky for its managers").
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decline to ask for cash instead of stock.
The argument is much the same for employees at all levels. A
corporate board is unlikely to think much of an executive who prefers
cash to options on the firm's future upside, and all the more so if
market pressures have already caused the board, as employer, to build
in something of a risk premium for the options.50
C. Indexed Options Revisited
1. The Problem
It would seem then that employees and employers should move
rather quickly to indexed options. By moving from conventional to
indexed options, employees would signal even more faith in them-
selves and the firm, while employers would locate risk-taking, confi-
dent employees. The stock option puzzle looms large-apart from
the super-risk alteration problem, or explanation.
By way of review, one offsetting possibility is that both sides realize
that it is too difficult to enforce a contractual prohibition against di-
versifying away the firm-specific risk. All employees can feign interest
in firm-specific, or indexed, options, while in reality purchasing on
their own instruments that offset these indexed options. As we have
seen, it is more difficult to diversify away the risk that conventional op-
tions impose.1
Another reaction to the renewed puzzle is that, to the extent that
indexed options decrease an employee's risk by eliminating systematic
risk, employees might give the wrong signal by encouraging a move
from conventional to indexed options. But this seems unlikely not
50 It is not as if the employer can offer less valuable options in lieu of cash and at-
tract or retain employees who fear that they will send negative signals. Other employ-
ers will offer cash, limited only by the self-selection problems which will be fairly small
until there is a considerable risk premium in the compensation offered by employers
who compensate with cash and options.
51 I do not mean to minimize the problem of employers ensuring that employees
with conventional options do not escape the intended incentives. But this is a problem
discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 36, at 453-57. The point here is that
it is easier to diversify away firm-specific risk so that, sans prohibitions by enforceable
contracts or by legal regimes (including insider trading laws and tax law discourage-
ments), employees will be more likely to unburden themselves of the risk associated
with indexed options than they would with fixed options. But the problem discussed
in the text is not limited to indexed options. Note also that diversifying away firm-
specific risk might be costly. Compensatory options have fairly long time horizons (for
both incentive and tax reasons), and an employee might therefore need to make nu-
merous offsetting investments.
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only because they would also send a positive signal about their own
work effort and their own confidence in the firm's relative perform-
ance, but also because the package can be weighted more heavily to-
ward options than before. Another signaling possibility is that the
firm fears that indexed options will fail to attract employees who be-
lieve that the industry is especially promising. This too seems unlikely
or unimportant because these potential employees can (by contract or
otherwise) invest in the industry in tandem with their firm-specific op-
tions. Finally, the employer-firm might fear that a move to indexed
options will signal that the firm predicts gloom for the industry (or
other benchmark) so that it avoids conventional options because
these will soon be underwater and useless as incentives. This seems to
be a weak explanation of the stock option puzzle because the firm can
simply index to the market as a whole, and it does not have special in-
formation about this benchmark.
In any event, the signaling idea helps us understand the evolution,
if it is that, from salary to bonuses and then to stock or stock options.
It is difficult for employees to decline this sort of risk. And if the firm
does not offer such risky compensation, relatively uninformed em-
ployees might themselves take it as a signal that upper-level employees
(who generally set the agenda for the directors) do not think much of
the firm's future.
The same may be true for employer debt, which can of course be
offered as part of the compensation package. Shareholders are disin-
clined to offer their agents much debt because these agents' incen-
tives will then be aligned more closely with creditors' than with the
shareholders' interests.5' At the same time, employees will hesitate to
ask for debt because, once again, they do not want to imply some lack
of faith in the firm's future)5
The harder task is to explain the disinclination to move from con-
ventional to indexed options.) The discussion now turns to this part
%, For the classic statement, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
(if theFirm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3J. FLN. EcON. 305
(1976).
r, In any event, following Jensen and Meckling, we might simply say that fringe
benefits related to retirement income already give the employees enough of a debt po-
sition, and that this debt is the most tax-advantaged kind.
I set aside the possibility that employees do not wish to suggest indexed options
for tear of appearing too risk averse. This can be offset by asking that a greater frac-
tion of compensation be in indexed-option form than in conventional fixed-option
form. I also do not fully explore the possibility that good benchmarks are too difficult
to construct or that indexed options might create new problems when managers con-
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of the puzzle.
2. Super-Risk Alteration and Overdifferentiation
with Indexing
We have already seen the idea that indexed options might en-
courage an employee to differentiate with respect to the benchmark
in an inefficient manner.5' My claim here is that shareholders must
worry that, if many employees hold indexed options, there will be too
much risk alteration and differentiation, even to the point where the
best projects in expected value terms are passed over in favor of riskier
choices. I refer to this problem as one of "super-risk alteration" be-
cause it is much more than the usual problem creditors have with
shareholders"6 and more than the risk-alteration problem that share-
holders have with employees who hold conventional stock options-as
these employees will also prefer more volatile projects than will share-
holders at large. Employees with indexed options are in the money
when their firm does better than the market (or industry)-and this is
more likely to happen when their firm takes chances that other firms
do not. They are in the money on the upside when the firm exceeds
the market (or the industry or other benchmark) and they are also
rewarded on the downside if the firm drops but does so by less than
the benchmark.
It is also useful to think of indexed options as asymmetric calls. If
the firm does better than the market, the holder-employee gains; if
the firm does worse than the market, the same employee does not pay
the employer or otherwise emerge with negative income. It is this
asymmetry that encourages extreme differentiation, or super-risk al-
teration. Imagine, for example, that an executive regards the em-
ployer-firm as on track to perform like the rest of the industry, apart
from slight variations to be caused by individual work effort. This ex-
ecutive now has the opportunity to differentiate the firm by guiding it
toward a radical product design. There is a one in three chance of
front takeover bids for the firm. Similarly, I accept the possibility that market pres-
sures may be weak so that, for example, managers may seek a form of compensation
(widely available conventional options) that easily camouflages their own high remu-
neration. My aim here is to show that risk alteration, signaling problems, and a norm
(described as one of "nonconflicting fortunes") may well play some role in the prea-
lence of conventional fixed options rather than indexed compensatory' options. How-
ever, I do not claim that all other variables are insignificant.
55 See supra Part I.C.2.b (introducing the concept of super-risk alteration).
rr For a discussion of this usual problem of risk alteration, see George G. Triantis,
A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993).
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stupendous success and a two-thirds chance of equally dramatic fail-
ure. If this executive holds a large number of indexed options, she
will be tempted by the chance of great rewards. Plainly, this super-risk
alteration arises because the executive holds options rather than in-
dexed securities or a symmetrically indexed contract with both bo-
nuses and penalties; there is no obligation to make payments to the
firm in the event that the design flops. To ask an employee to take
such a position in the firm, in other words to hold a kind of symmetri-
cal, indexed security for incentive purposes, would require not only
substantial monitoring to ensure that the employee did not escape
this risk, but also so much more in the way of compensation as to
make the cost prohibitive to the employer.17 The indexed-option-
laden employee will therefore be tempted to commit the firm to
much riskier projects than shareholders would like. These projects
may come with lower expected values than other projects available to
the firm but the employee is looking for any reasonable chance of
beating the market. If all executives in a firm, or a substantial fraction
of all its employees, hold indexed options, it seems likely that the su-
per-risk alteration problem will be grave. Put differently, indexed op-
tions in the hands of all executives might induce terrific work effort,
but they would do so at too great a cost in terms of the losses to the
firm from investing in projects of a high-risk, differentiated, and rela-
tively low expected value character.
Of course, not all employees are in a position to commit the firm
to such (inefficient and) risky endeavors. Some employees may not
have such responsibilities and others may be easy to monitor. Moreo-
ver, some employees, or even some of these employees, may be more
averse with respect to the risk associated with conventional stock op-
-.7 Furthermore, the employee may simply be thought unable to pay when the firm
does poorly. Note that I continue to assume that if indexed options are superior on
incentive-compatibility grounds, then the employer will not want the employee to es-
cape the risk by diversif)ing. This seems to be a reasonable assumption, although al-
ternatives are plausible. The easiest case is when, as before, the employee would diver-
sify by investing in a competitor whose value was negatively correlated with the
employer. Se supra text accompanying note 39 (giving an example of an aircraft
manufacturer with zero-sum prospects). The alternative is that there may be occasions
(or industries) in which hard work by an employee raises all ships. The employee may,
for example, uork hard to develop equipment that enables all aircraft to land and take
off in terrible weather. This employee will work even harder if she profits not only
from employer A's increased value but also from competitor B's increased value, when
B copies or buys the new technology from A. But I will imagine that this is unusual and
that in most cases when an employer indexes to a benchmark, it prefers that its em-
ployee not avoid the comparison by diversifying away the risk.
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tions offered by the firm. The puzzle, then, is why these employees do
not bargain for indexed options, and why the firm does not selectively
offer indexed options to these employees. The prospect of indexed
options in the hands of all employees may be too costly in terms of
super-risk alteration. But it would seem more manageable for the
employer to have selected employees with indexed options while most
received and held conventional options. The puzzle is reinforced by
the fact that the conventionally compensated employees would help
in monitoring the indexed employees or would, at least, limit the like-
lihood that the decisionmaking process would become too skewed in
favor of high-risk projects that aimed to differentiate this firm from
the benchmark of the industry or the market as a whole. In short, the
remaining puzzle is why we do not find selected employees receiving
indexed rather than fixed options.
3. Norms
We arrive, finally, at the potential for effective norms. To begin, it
is tempting in a norms conference to launch the idea that we have a
norm against "talking about money" and that this explains why nei-
ther employee nor employer suggests indexed options. However, this
alone will not explain our puzzle because conventional options, com-
missions, and some bonus systems are hugely popular even though
they must be initiated somehow and even though they generate con-
versations about money around the water cooler and in the executive
dining room.
We need norms only to explain the disinclination to offer indexed
options to a subset of executives or employees, because we have al-
ready seen the problem with indexed options for all. First, it is useful
to recall that these indexed options will be in the money even when
the firm does poorly in absolute terms, so long as it does better than
the benchmark. Imagine one situation in this sort of downturn; both
the firm and the economy as a whole have experienced a bad period
in absolute terms, but the firm is doing better than the benchmark.
Most executives (and other option-holding employees) are well out of
the money with their conventional options. Yet those with indexed
options-if selected members of the group were offered indexed op-
tions-would be celebrating their good fortune.
My sense is that there is frequently a norm that might be de-
scribed as an insistence that, or preference for, everyone in a group
rising or falling together, at least to the extent necessary to prevent
conflicts within the group. To the extent that institutions can be de-
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signed so that members of a single community do not find that some
rise while others fall, life will be easier together. To be sure, the
members of a community might not want to share their fortunes when
it would be sensible to diversify, risks. But to the extent that they are
similarly situated, there is something of a norm against advertising the
presence of conflicting fortunes. It would be awkward or even unac-
ceptable for some executives to celebrate their new wealth while oth-
ers did poorly because their conventional options were well underwa-
ter.
A different version of this argument appeals to the intuition that
these markets are imperfect and that executive pay involves a good
deal of barely constrained self-dealing. Executives might be able to
elicit high compensation in the form of compensatory options be-
cause such options seem to align their interests with those of share-
holders, but it would be more difficult to extract high compensation if
these options were very much in the money even when shareholders
did poorly (in absolute terms). I like to think that the right rhetoric
or educator could convince shareholders that indexed options were in
their interests, so I prefer the first version of the argument offered
here."
Readers who share this intuition about the arrangement of "non-
conflicting fortunes" will now have a complete picture. Employers do
not offer indexed options to all employees in the targeted class, even
though this would impose less risk and be less expensive and more in-
centive compatible, because of the problems of super-risk alteration
and overdifferentiation. And they do not offer indexed options to se-
lected employees in this class, such as those willing to accept less pay
in return for less risk, because this would violate the norm of noncon-
flicting fortunes.) Note that for a variety of reasons, it makes sense to
think of a legal fiction, such as a corporate employer, as abiding by a
norm. The entity itself might profit from establishing a reputation
that grows with conforming to a norm; the entity is associated with in-
dividuals who cannot escape the norms and the reputational attach-
ments that they have absorbed; also, the entity might abide by norms
because its employees or customers are prone to respond to signals in
certain ways.
I am indebted to Mel Eisenberg and Eric Orts for suggestions along these lines.
I am not claiming that all employees must be paid the same. This is obviously a
rare practice. Instead the claim is that one executive's pay will not be negatively corre-
lated uith another's except perhaps when they are in plainly advantageous competi-
tion for prizes or promotions.
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Most readers will find this claim either too convenient or too weak
in the face of the advantages of satisfying different preferences within
a group or simply diversifying risk. 0 I try to improve upon the claim
(in the next Part) with some additional evidence of such a norm. The
more this nonconflicting-fortunes norm is found, the more plausible
it becomes that such a norm can explain practices with respect to em-
ployee compensation. First, however, it is useful to make a few obser-
vations in order to complete the story offered here.
It is unlikely that the firm could avoid the super-risk alteration
problem, associated with giving indexed options to all employees in
the class, by substituting semi-indexed options that paid when the firm
exceeded the benchmark in an upside market but did not pay when
the firm did poorly in absolute terms, even though it out-performed
the benchmark. Such a semi-indexed, or upside-indexed, option
would impose even more risk on the employee than conventional op-
tions and would come at such a grave price to the firm as to make it
(perhaps) prohibitive. Moreover, this sort of option would not elimi-
nate the risk-alteration problem. The employee would still prefer
much more volatility than most shareholders and peer employees with
conventional options. This employee will continue to try to differen-
tiate the firm from its peers in ways that other investors would not
want. Only by extracting money from the employee if the project
does poorly will the employee internalize the shareholders' prefer-
ences. As discussed earlier, this sort of arrangement, amounting to an
indexed security or indexed compensation, would surely impose too
much risk.
In short, using a variety of tools, we are able to understand the
popularity of conventional compensatory options and even the disin-
clination to offer some indexed options. These indexed options
could both reduce risk for the employees in question and provide su-
perior work incentives. Employees who sought to be part of this in-
dexing, however, would not only be signaling their aversion to risk
(which may be a negative signal), but also would be asking to be re-
warded in a manner not correlated (and sometimes negatively corre-
lated) with their peers. When the firm rose with the market, the con-
60 Note that this community of executives is not normally one that would gain
from risk diversification among its members. It is not as if we expect most executives
of firm A to subsidize the college education of other A executives' children if the latter
group does poorly. In contrast, members of a small town might benefit by not having
their children in one army regiment, and this sort of diversification, at the expense of
camaraderie and the norm of nonconflicting fortunes, might well be desired.
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ventional option holders would celebrate while the indexed option
holders would receive nothing. Only when the market did very well
and the firm did even better would the two groups have similar for-
tunes. And when the indexed option holders were in the money be-
cause the firm's share price dropped less than the market as a whole,
the indexed option holders would do well while the conventional
group would be out of the money-campaigning for revision of the
option terms and the like.
I am comfortable with the claim or social observation that many
workplaces, and perhaps virtually all workplaces, could not tolerate
such tension among peers. I think it fair to call this a norm, although
it is possible to stress instead (or equivalently) the possible conflicts
that would arise among the differently compensated groups and to in-
sist that these conflicts simply create inefficiencies that are overcome
by declining to introduce any indexed options. The norm perspective
looks better when we think of the nonconflicting-fortunes norm as re-
lated to other norms about compensation and money.
D. Bonuses Revisited
Before turning to these other, related norms, it is useful to return
to bonuses for some confirmation of the arguments offered here. At
various points I have suggested both that bonuses might duplicate the
incentive and risk characteristics of (fixed or indexed) options and
that in some instances bonuses might appear inferior or superior as a
component in a compensation package. Two additional points are
now worth adding. First, to the extent that bonuses are tied ex ante or
ex post, whether by contract or by practice, to firm-specific perform-
ance, these bonuses not only impose risks on the employee but also
generate risk-alteration problems for the employer. We might say that
bonuses often duplicate indexed options, so that both compensation
tools create problems of risk alteration and excessive differentiation.
In fact, most bonus systems probably fall in between conventional and
indexed options. The expected bonus is greater as the firm does bet-
ter in absolute terms, but there is room for reward based on firm-
specific performance. The bonus might duplicate the compensation
package of an employee who held a mixture of fixed and indexed
compensatory options. Bonuses are like conventional options in that
their value is linked to the absolute value (or profits) of the firm, but
of course this means that the link is to both the market as a whole and
the firm as a relative performer. To the extent that the bonus rises
with the relative profits or value of the employer-firm, the super-risk
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alteration problem is present. With most bonuses, this problem is not
as great as it is when the employee is given comparable value in in-
dexed options alone. We might simply note a small, new puzzle,
namely the apparent fact that more executives are not offered some
partially indexed options.
Second, bonuses also run the risk of creating tension by violating
the norm of nonconflicting fortunes. To the extent that an advantage
of bonuses is that they can be individually tailored, perhaps according
to the responsibilities of the given employee, there is the danger of
nonconflicting fortunes. Of course, this danger has an element of
healthy competition or monitoring to it. Thus, if executives are re-
warded based on the sales or profits of their respective divisions, then
they may spend time arguing about the allocation of costs common to
their divisions or they may decline to pursue policies that are good for
the firm as a whole, but not cost effective in terms of the bonus keyed
to one particular division. In principle, these conflicts can be solved
with perfectly tailored bonus schemes, but in practice there are likely
to be tensions. The nonconflicting-fortunes norm might in this way
"explain" or be reflected in the practice of offering relatively uniform
bonuses, which is to say that bonuses are not nearly as individualized
as might first seem appropriate from an incentive-compatibility per-
spective. In any event, note that bonuses can be awarded ex post, with
or without discretion, and in the form of options, fixed or indexed.
III. SPEAKING OF MONEY
On its own, the preceding claim about compensation norms may
be provocative but unpersuasive. It is simply a story about why we do
not find some employees bargaining with the employer to substitute
indexed options for conventional options.6' It is not at all obvious that
it is a better story than that offered, for instance, by the fact that ac-
counting standards discriminate between fixed and indexed options.62
But the norms story is strengthened once we recognize the familiarity
of the idea that there is something of a norm not to bargain or even to
speak about money when one's fellows may have conflicting or dispa-
rate fortunes.
61 Thus, we might just as well devote effort to explaining why employees do not
bargain away from conventional stock options to greater use of cash and indexed
compensation. Bonus packages would seem capable of replicating the incentive com-
patibility of the conventional option package at lower cost.
62 See supra Part IA.2 (noting that the accounting explanation requires an
assumption of ignorant or irrational investors).
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It will do no good to point to the etiquette of not speaking about
money quite generally. Children may be taught that a family's income
and the value of a family's assets or material gifts are things to be kept
private, but of course there is plenty of money-talk in the workplace
and in some places surely much discussion about the current value of
conventional compensatory options. The trick continues to be to ex-
plain the use of conventional options when compensating all of a
firm's executives, or even most of its employees, but the absence of
the alternative of indexed options for some.
Why is it that in our culture we are taught not to discuss money?
We hesitate to reveal the cost of our houses, the amount of our sala-
ries, the extent of our stock holdings, the size of our income tax li-
abilities, the value of the gifts we receive or give, and so forth. In
some cases we see interest in such topics as revealing an overly materi-
alistic, perhaps selfish person. The norm against being such a person
is fairly easy to explain. But the norm about money-talk extends to in-
clude discussion of gratuities and charitable contributions. To be
sure, we reveal and even publish contributions to specific charities.
But when we know that X gave $10,000 to a specific charity's cam-
paign, we generally have no idea what X gave in total to all charities
that year. The published number provides some information per-
haps. An interested member of the audience might identify with Xs
professional status, or reason that X lives in a house valued about the
same as the reader, and this observer might therefore see that X at
least, values this charity in a certain way.
A narrower and more accurate description of the norm is, I think,
that we are taught not to discuss money when to do so highlights ine-
quality and conflicting fortunes. We seek to avoid unpleasant com-
parisons and envy, but we encourage group solidarity even at the ex-
pense of the risk of envy. The more our fortunes are correlated with
the fortunes of our listeners, the more money-talk is acceptable. In
these cases, talking about money signals solidarity and mutual effort
rather than greed and condescension. Thus, neighbors might discuss
recent real estate tax assessments, but otherwise not discuss home val-
ues or even renovation costs with acquaintances who live in other
neighborhoods. Many law professors would be more inclined to di-
vulge their salaries to friends who work in law firms than to friends
who teach at their or other law schools. In this case, envy and ill-
feeling is more likely inside the community.
This nonconflicting-fortunes norm may be closely related to the
interesting norm surrounding confidentiality about salaries. In some
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workplaces, employers ask, or even "require," employees to refrain• 63
from sharing information about their compensation. In some cases
employees might be given information about average raises alongside
their own, but otherwise disclosure is discouraged. This employer
preference can be understood as promoting solidarity because it is
thought to lessen envy and the like and employees abide by the wishes
of their employer to a remarkable degree. Of course, a skeptic might
say that the employer requests confidentiality because the employer
enjoys its monopsony and prefers that employees delude themselves
into thinking they are well-treated. The employer may also prefer that
employees have less information with which to come asking for in-
creased salaries as individuals or as a group.
One cost to the employer (and perhaps to the employee) is that
silence mutes the signals that the employer can send to individual
employees. An employee who receives a low increase in a given year
might not recognize the signal for what it is without information
about the increases bestowed on peer employees whose work effort
and relationships our employee can observe and compare with her
own. Knowledge about the average increase helps somewhat but
without information about the distribution of increases its value is lim-
ited. Presumably, most employers who request confidentiality choose
not to offer full information of this sort on grounds that the informa-
tion itself will spark too much curiosity about the identity of those who
did and did not receive certain treatments. On the other hand, it is
barely possible that most employees, or at least those on both margins,
are well aware of compensation levels at competing firms if only be-
cause they receive or seek offers from these other employers. In such
case, the cost of the confidentiality norm is low.
63As a legal matter, employers may be unable to force silence on their employees.
There are cases in which the employer made confidentiality more than a suggestion
and then fired an employee who violated the rule. It appears that a well-advised em-
ployee-plaintiff can do well by arguing that the speech was a part of organizing em-
ployees or that it was part of collecting information for another legal claim. Compare
Aroostook County Reg'l Ophthalmology Ctr. v. NLRB, 81 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(reversing part of NLRB findings that enforcing a rule of silence, though not with re-
spect to compensation, was an unfair labor practice but implying that some restrictions
would be acceptable), and Jeannette Corp. v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1976)
(opining that discussion about wages could be protected, concerted activity as neces-
sary to further the goal of organizational activity, even when the confidentiality policy
had been in effect for many years prior to the organizing campaign), with Williams v.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., No. 98-2084, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11914 (D. Kan.
July 30, 1999) (finding for the defendant who fired an employee because she discussed
her salary with another employee).
PUZZLING STOCK OPTIONS
Note that here too we might expect a sticky practice because of
signaling considerations. An employee who thinks the confidentiality
norm unwise, or who perceives great gain from information-sharing,
will hesitate to defy the employer, even by talking with another em-
ployee. Noncompliance is dangerous because it might be understood
as a signal that one is a troublemaker, regularly disgruntled, eager to
promote envy and discord, or contemplating exit. 4 It may even be
costly to ask the employer to reconsider the confidentiality instruction
because the inquiry itself might be understood as a sign of discontent
or lack of faith in the employer's centralized compensation-setting
function. Much as an employee will not want to ask for substitution
away from conventional options to straight salary (even at lower cost
to the employer), the employee will not want to ask for an end to the
confidentiality instruction.
Most employees would not even be the first to suggest that their
employer put a suggestion box in the workplace, because to do so
risks signaling a belief that the employer is imperfect or difficult to
approach. The same employees will hardly question the wisdom or
fairness of confidentiality rules and they would surely not ask to be re-
lieved of the risk of conventional compensatory options.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that confidentiality is successfully im-
posed on, or suggested to, relatively small, cohesive workplaces. If this
is the case, then it strengthens the norms claim just advanced. Faculty
members, for example, are in some places part of a lock-step salary
system based on seniority, in which case they surely have nonconflict-
ing fortunes.f' Where their pay is individualized, a confidentiality
norm is often in place (at least as much as possible until there is pub-
lication by third parties and the like), and we can see this practice as
aiming to maintain the sense of community. These employees are
asked not to speak about money precisely where talk might produce
envy and might emphasize the fact that to some degree one faculty
member's raise comes at the expense of another.
,j Ironically, it is possible that the confidentiality practice increases the chance of
exit as it limits an employee's opportunity for "voice."
,., In some cases it is tempting to go so far as to say that if a group is unlikely to
abide by confidentiality, perhaps because it regards the employer as an adversary not
to be trusted, then the employer and the group may be wise to insist on lock-step com-
pensation in order to promote group solidarity. This turns around the usual direction
of the cause and effect.
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CONCLUSION
It is easy to explain the move from salaries alone to salaries with
some bonuses to a package of salaries alongside employer's stock and
then to salaries with conventional compensatory stock options, though
it would not be surprising to find a move back to bonus plans of vary-
ing complexity. It is harder to explain the apparent dominance of
conventional stock options over indexed stock options. The standard
explanation focuses on accounting treatments, but this sort of expla-
nation defies normal assumptions about rational investors.
I have tried here to heighten the puzzle of conventional stock op-
tions and then to solve it. Tax and risk-premium considerations
probably deepen the puzzle, although in passing there is an explana-
tion for the popularity of conventional stock options even for low-level
employees in some finns, namely those with no present tax liability.
But the failure of firms completely to substitute indexed options
for conventional options can be explained as reflecting the danger
that indexed options will cause agents to engage in what I have called
super-risk alteration, or even inefficient differentiation of tie firm as
compared to benchmark firms. This problem arises because it is
thought to be too costly for the employer-firm to impose indexed se-
curities, as opposed to asymmetrical options, on employees; the op-
tions encourage dangerous differentiation because the holder-
employees do not pay when the firm does relatively poorly.
This leaves the puzzle of why indexed options are not offered to,
or bargained for by, the subset of employees who are easiest to moni-
tor or most eager to eliminate the systematic risk associated with con-
ventional options. Here the solution lies in signaling and in the ap-
parent norm of nonconflicting fortunes. Employees hesitate to
decline conventional options because they might be seen as shirkers,
early departers, skeptics about the firm, or unattractively risk averse.
And the firm might hesitate to offer indexed options alongside con-
ventional options because to do so would create tension among em-
ployees. We do not talk about money when to do so highlights ine-
qualities, and coexisting options of this sort would create just such
inequalities and the envy that goes along with it.
In the end, only a modest fraction of the compensation story of-
fered here relies on norms thinking. Signaling and super-risk altera-
tion play larger roles. But the overall story is a new one and the role
played by norms in understanding the stock option puzzle is a useful
opportunity for thinking about the more general norm about money
talk.
